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A B S T R A C T Our purpose in this article is to identify and suggest
resolution for two core problematics of grounded theory. First, while
grounded theory provides transparency to one part of the
conceptualization process, where codes emerge directly from the data, it
provides no such systematic or transparent way for gaining insight into
the conceptual relationships between discovered codes. Producing a
grounded theory depends not only on the definition of conceptual pieces,
but the delineation of a relationship between at least two of those pieces.
Second, the conceptualization process of grounded theory is done in
hierarchical fashion, where individual codes emerge from the data but
then are used to generate insight into more general concepts and
thematic statements. But various works on grounded theory have failed
to provide any systematic way of using data specific levels of scale (the
codes) to gain insight into more macro levels of scale (concepts and
themes). We offer fractal concept analysis as a means of resolving both of
these issues. By using a logic structure generator, fractal concept analysis
delineates self-similar conceptual frameworks at various levels of
abstraction, yielding a method for linking concepts together within and
between levels of scale encountered in the grounded theory coding and
categorization process. We conclude that this fractal analytic technique
can bolster the aims of grounded theory as a formalized and systematic
process for generating theory from empirical data.
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Introduction
‘Problematic’ is a word much abused in the academy. Properly utilized, it is
not just the intellectual sounding version of the word ‘problem,’ but rather
intended to note ambiguities and things yet unresolved. Our title is something
of a tribute to Neil Smelser’s Problematics of Sociology, a work premised on the
idea that disciplinary bickering over macro and micro approaches proceeds
under a cloud of ambiguity about what those really are. Similarly, for the vary-
ing grounded theory approaches offered and vigorously defended, there
remain glaring ambiguities about the theory building process.
Our purpose in this article is to identify and suggest resolution for two core
problematics of grounded theory. First, grounded theory provides trans-
parency to one part of the conceptualization process, where concepts, initially
in the form of codes, ‘emerge’ directly from the data in a process brilliantly
designed to facilitate the development of the researcher’s conceptual insight.
But then, at the crucial point where real theory begins, it provides no such sys-
tematic or transparent way for gaining insight into the conceptual relation-
ships between emergent concepts. Producing theory depends not only on the
definition of conceptual pieces, but the delineation of a relationship between
at least two of those pieces. For example, we can delineate a concept of poverty
and a concept of health status, but we have no real theory until we gain insight
into how poverty and health interweave each other. As building theory is
the central purpose of grounded theory, the failure to provide facilitation for
conceptual relationships, as it does for conceptual pieces, ought to be an
important concern.
Second, the conceptualization process of grounded theory is done in hierar-
chical fashion, where individual codes emerge from the data but then are used
to generate insight into more general concepts and thematic statements. But
various works on grounded theory have failed to provide any systematic way
of using data specific levels of scale (the codes) to gain insight into concepts at
broader levels of scale (categories and ultimately themes).
Along with discussing these two problematics of grounded theory, we offer
a fresh approach for resolving them, which we call fractal concept analysis.1
As self-organized systems replicated at various levels of scale, the fundamental
nature of fractals suggests a clear benefit to grounded theory. Such a tech-
nique allows us to assemble multiple emergent concepts into conceptual struc-
tures and to systematically work between data-specific and broader levels of
scale. After discussing this analytic technique in more detail, we offer a basic
example from our ethnographic homeless research to illustrate its success.
While we directly address grounded theory, fractal concept analysis speaks
more broadly to the empirical problems encountered in an array of qualitative
approaches, many of which are ‘grounded’ in the data in one way or another.
Additionally, while social science often is consumed with epistemic dis-
agreements between positivists and interpretivists, a dichotomy too often
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misunderstood as synonymous with the quantitative-qualitative divide, we
show how fractal concept analysis can avoid the trappings of naïve positivism
without falling into nihilistic relativism. That is, we can make the empirical
processes of grounded theory more rigorous without eliminating the notion of
conceptual analysis as multi-dimensional, but also without falling into the
‘anything goes’ mentality of extreme postmodernism (see also Rennie 1998,
for a discussion of grounded theory as a combination of abductive and induc-
tive processes which steers between realism and relativism).
Grounded theory
A S O R D I D PA S T
There is a bit of sociological folklore about C. Wright Mills that we have heard
in various incarnations throughout the years. We will paraphrase the story
like this:
Upon publication of The Power Elite, a sociologist friend of Mills published a
scathing critique of his work. The average scholar would be heart-broken; these
are the kinds of things that end longstanding friendships in academia. Being an
established force in the discipline, Mills certainly would have been in a position to
do battle. Instead he replied with a letter containing only one sentence: ‘How can
I make it better?’
We do not know if this story is true, but clearly it is instructive. To be actively
intellectual means to resist circling one’s wagons, to instead work toward new
ideas all of the time. This is easier said than done, but certainly is something
for which to strive. Grounded theory often is hotly contested with some past
discussions being rather nasty.2 This is a shame.
We might easily have ignored this sordid past of grounded theory, but as we
hope to offer an innovative work, it is appropriate to first identify and counter
things that stand in the way. We appeal to those who wish to be creative rather
than dogmatic on recognition that the basis of intellectual life is that no propo-
sition is beyond critique, no idea beyond improvement. We join in spirit, if not
exact opinion, Bryant (2002), Charmaz (2006), Clarke (2005), and many
scholars from different disciplines across the globe in feeling that the basics of
the grounded theory framework can be merged with new analytic techniques
that will continue to generate creatively diverse studies, acknowledging that
how the grounded theory guidelines and assumptions are used is not a neutral
process (see also Bryant and Charmaz, 2007).
T H E G RO U N D E D T H E O RY T E C H N I Q U E
Certainly grounded theory as a whole represents not just a specific analytic
schematic, but more generally an epistemic frame of mind. Where we refer to
it as a ‘technique’ however, we wish to indicate its specific analytic processes as
laid out by its founders and proponents because it is there that the problematics
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we identify emerge most clearly. The general epistemic orientation of grounded
theory really is widely shared in both the natural and social sciences, emerg-
ing wherever data are allowed to directly generate knowledge, rather than
used to verify hypotheses. Ethnographers, for example, commonly utilize a
grounded episteme even when not utilizing the specific coding and conceptu-
alization techniques of grounded theory proper. Additionally, while Glaser
(2002) suggests that grounded theory generally overcomes distinctions
between qualitative and quantitative methods, as an analytic process it pri-
marily has been utilized to generate insights from qualitative data. We there-
fore focus our efforts at grounded theory as a qualitative method, but
certainly do not deny its broader possibilities.
In so far as we address problematics found within the most basic coding
and conceptualization processes of grounded theory, our treatment of it will
attempt to focus on the root description found in Glaser and Strauss (1967). We
note significant developments where appropriate, but tracing out the varia-
tions that descended from this seminal work is beyond the scope of this article
(for this, see Charmaz, 2000; Rennie, 1996). However, it is our estimation that
fractal concept analysis will fit with any variation, although it will be under-
pinned by different assumptions, which may have an effect on the ultimate
interpretation of the conceptual products. Finally, our description of grounded
theory will be common knowledge to many readers, but its rampant abuse sug-
gests that assuming understanding or consensus is not warranted (see espe-
cially Glaser [2002] for an account of the improper uses of grounded theory).
Grounded theory was ‘discovered’ by Glaser and Strauss (1965, 1968) dur-
ing their studies of death and dying in hospitals, first detailed in their founda-
tional work, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967), and then further
specified in Glaser (1978).3 It essentially is a process of coding data and then
grouping those codes into concepts in an increasingly hierarchical fashion
(although we should note that ‘codes’ also are concepts which denote particu-
lar parts of the data). Ultimately, theoretical models emerge where concepts
are arranged into theoretical propositions. Unlike typical hypothesis testing,
which begins with the development of hypotheses that are tested with subse-
quently collected data, in grounded theory everything begins with the data.
Furthermore, rather than employing the standard order of data collection
then data analysis, in grounded theory data collection and analysis is dynamic
and multi-layered. That is, motivated by the notion that sociological concepts
should be an organic, integral part of social life rather than something artifi-
cially attached by remote experts, data is collected and then analysed and then
more data is collected and analyzed in order to pursue emerging themes from
the first wave of analysis. This cyclical process is repeated until there is no new
emergent conceptual information, a point that has been called ‘saturation’
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Conceptual themes are pursued intentionally by
focusing or altering questions in subsequent interviews and by theoretically
sampling new respondents.
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Initial coding is open-ended and done ‘line by line.’4 This essentially means
breaking down the data and identifying concepts embedded within individual
statements. As line by line coding proceeds, recurring concepts will illustrate
‘focused codes’ (Charmaz, 2006). Focused codes are directed, representing
what the researcher feels most accurately explain the recurring concepts that
are beginning to emerge from the data.
In grounded theory, data driven themes emerge through a process of ‘con-
stant comparison’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). As it literally indicates, this
means that everything is compared with everything and all of the time.
Statements within an interview are compared with each other and with other
interviews, new data are compared with older data, conceptual categories
derived from some data are compared with other data directly and with the
conceptual categories derived from that data, and so on (Charmaz, 2006; see
also Clarke [2005] for her unique focus on situational, social and positional
mapping processes). While grounded theory often is understood as a building-
up of concepts from the data, the process of constant comparison brings data-
specific codes and broader concepts into an insight generating dialogue, as
opposed to a simple grouping process.
As focused codes and broader concepts emerge from the data one must
remember that they do not become a priori concepts for subsequently collected
data. Instead, grounded theory deals with discrepancies between new data
and previous concepts by modifying the conceptual scheme with synthesis,
rather than dismissing or explaining away non-fitting data or ‘forcing’ that
data to fit (Glaser, 1992). There is no such thing as an outlier in grounded
theory, in the sense that no data is dismissed from investigation because of
non-central tendencies. Rather, concepts, and the larger conceptual scheme,
are constantly improved by synthesizing new data or new analysis of older
data.5 For those committed to more typical theory building strategies where
concepts are thought of as mere abstractions of data, such a process seems to
only generate uselessly abstract concepts lacking the ability to predict new
social outcomes. This would underestimate the value of developing concepts
intimately connected with, and responsive to, actually lived social life.
As focused coding proceeds, the researcher engages in the memo-making
process.6 Memo writing allows the researcher to flesh out emergent concepts.
Memos are written in narrative form and allow the researchers to expound on
emergent themes while building linkages between concepts. Through this process
one is able to elevate significant codes into categories. By continually comparing
data with categories in memos, categories begin to fill out and can be further elab-
orated, advancing theory development throughout the whole process. Through
theoretical sampling, new data are sought, and with the procedure of constant
comparison, one eventually moves toward developing a theoretical framework.
While writing up a manuscript draft, new gaps are identified and concepts further
refined. As the grounded theorist finally turns to the existing literature, the whole
piece is reworked, which culminates in theory construction (Charmaz, 2001).
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In the end, through all these procedures, grounded theorists suggest that we
get integrated theory. However, exactly how theory leaps out of the data
through this process will still seem ambiguous to the reader and rightly so. In
other words, while it may be clear how the technique promotes insight in the
development of initial codes, the ones that are explicit in the data, it is not clear
exactly how this promotes insight into conceptual structures, and thereby leaves
one with the impression that the latter may be based merely on the musings of
the individual researcher. Glaser (1978: 72) attempts to address this by delin-
eating theoretical coding as separate from but analogous to substantive coding,
but he admits, ‘theoretical codes are always implicit’ and ultimately leaves
it unclear just how they can be surely explicated. However, his suggestion of 18
commonly discovered theoretical coding families demonstrates a need to address
this ambiguity. We fill this need with fractal concept analysis, which can encap-
sulate Glaser’s (1978) suggested theoretical coding families in a way that expli-
cates a logic structure for theory building. We later return to Glaser’s theoretical
coding families in comparison to the analytic technique we offer here.
A S S E S S I N G G RO U N D E D T H E O RY
In a refreshingly brazen way, Glaser and Strauss (1967) asserted grounded
theory as a formal way to develop theory. Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of Scientific
Revolutions had been published five years earlier, but sociology was not yet fully
in the grip of the postmodern critique. While they did not intend to suggest
that grounded theory was deductive, by today’s standards the claims of Glaser
and Strauss that grounded theory is a technique of discovering concepts that
are in the data and indeed that they had themselves ‘discovered’ the technique,
may seem exceedingly positivist. Many are skeptical about the extent to which
grounded theory successfully systematizes empirical observation through its
analytic processes. After all, coding and categorizing are still in the hands of
the individual researcher. But assessing grounded theory on whether emer-
gent concepts have truth correspondence to the actual world not only is
abysmal, it is unfair (see also Carrithers, 1990). Quantitative techniques have
not met that challenge, yet widely are held as formal and even as approximat-
ing natural science. The fair test of grounded theory concerns whether its par-
ticular analytic processes improve observation and it ultimately is on these
grounds that integrating fractal concept analysis moves toward a more rigor-
ous way of analyzing data.
It is commonly, though not universally, held that researcher bias is antithet-
ical to rigorous science. While many epistemologists contend that human
biases simply are part of science either because they cannot or should not be
controlled for, those doing research mostly attempt to control for bias usually
either by eliminating it with various methodological controls – the approach
more popular in quantitative research – or by indulging bias to make it explicit
and transparent – the approach more popular in qualitative research.
Fundamentally, bias is a problem primarily generated in the act of empirical
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observation. Possible confounding factors might include the researcher’s polit-
ical and social values or personal conflicts and self-interest, but these
ultimately are concerns because they potentially cloud observation. The devel-
opment of science is the accumulation of techniques that control for the unre-
liability of raw empirical observation. This is why qualitative research has
fallen behind in the estimation of the increasingly quantitatively oriented
social sciences; most qualitative research remains wholly and unapologetically
dependent upon raw observation.
Those who criticize the scientistic claims of quantitative techniques are
quite correct, however, on at least one account. That is, quantitative methods
also are dependent on observation and therefore subject to the same funda-
mental critique, though we may convincingly say that on the whole the quan-
titative camp has done a better job of responding. Still, those crunching the
numbers often do conveniently forget that statistical work functions simply by
turning empirical observations into numerical expressions, but still are obser-
vations. So the ultimate question for both quantitative and qualitative methods
is the same: can observation be trusted or are we doomed to the nihilism of
extreme postmodernists? Quantitative measurement approaches (at least
those done rigorously) indeed suggest that observation can be made better or
worse, that is, more or less reliable.
Take for example that as researchers we decide to assess hospital treatments
as correlated with various other things. We could sit at the hospital and count
the number of times a given person comes in over the course of a year. But
observing entrances into the hospital may not capture conceptually what we
are actually interested in. A person could simply be visiting a sick relative.
So we should modify our observational parameter to eliminate this factor.
Perhaps we can use medical records to identify the number of treatments that
a person received. This will rule out all visitors. However, what counts as treat-
ment? If a person seeks treatment for a deep cut and then returns to have the
stitches removed, does this count as one treatment or two? This all depends on
what our suspected correlates of interest are, but for now, let us say we wish it
to count such a case as one treatment. We might therefore additionally modify
our observational scheme to control for multiple visits for the treatment of
single conditions. In each step we improve our observations by controlling for
the confounding factors of raw empiricism.
Additionally, we may change our hospital treatment research altogether
and decide to ask people themselves how many times they have been to the
hospital to deal with medical problems. In doing so we have controlled for our
own bias as researchers, but now rely on the observations of each respondent.
Specifically, we are faced with respondent recall bias. If we ask about hospital
treatments over the last 10 years, the self-observations may be rather fuzzy. So
we then would likely modify our recall frame to cover only one year. Perhaps
we have belabored the point, but it is as important as it is simple. Researcher
bias can be attenuated; empirical observation can be made better or worse.
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While qualitative approaches in general may not have made as much
progress as quantitative approaches with what we might call the problem of
raw observation, grounded theory has provided a comparatively high stan-
dard. Not only does grounded theory use social science data, which is funda-
mentally observational, but its conceptualization techniques essentially
instruct a process of making observations about data, or we might say, obser-
vations about observations.
Certainly the most admirable thing about Glaser and Strauss (1967) was
that they took a position that qualitative researchers at the time were shying
away from and now seem to have abandoned entirely.7 That is, they coura-
geously asserted that qualitative research can be made more rigorous, that its
observations can be made more reliable. While people have varying opinions
about exactly how successful grounded theory is on this account, the com-
parative processes and other conceptualization techniques (e.g. hierarchical
coding processes) make clear improvements on unchecked empiricism. Just as
we improved our observational scheme in the above hypothetical, grounded
theory compels us to improve our conceptual scheme (i.e. our grouped obser-
vations of the data) when new observations clash with previously emergent
conceptions.
But how does grounded theory fare with regard to developing theory from
observed concepts? Quantitative approaches are able to side-step this problem
because they can support or discredit any theory via the verification or discon-
firmation of hypotheses; essentially they are able to leave it up to the theorist,
suggesting that scientists can hypothesize whatever they want so long as they
test their hypotheses. Philosophy of science has essentially endorsed this move
by calling the process through which scientists intuit theoretical ideas the ‘psy-
chological problem’ (Hume, 1739 [1978]; Popper, 2002; Wundt, 1973). While
grounded theorists have taken this problem head-on, the process offered for
theory building is the same process used for developing concepts (see Glaser’s
[1978] discussion of ‘theoretical coding’). Just as postulated concepts have to
enter into a dialogue with the raw observations until confidence emerges, so
also do theoretical structures have to dialogue with both concepts and raw
observations until confidence emerges. But without a unique process for the
latter, it remains unclear whether grounded theory provides an actual improve-
ment over conventional theory building practices that allow theorists to use
their intuitions to do what may be essentially the same thing. In other words,
grounded theory clearly improves the conceptualization process where specific
concepts (i.e. codes) emerge from the data, but the assumed extension of this
technique to assembling concepts into theory is unsatisfying. The data illus-
trate the codes, but there is no explicated technique that convincingly illus-
trates how multiple codes fit together in a logical relation or in a broader
conceptual grouping. So while grounded theorists have spent much time on
coding, they leave unclear just how the logical relation of multiple concepts,
that is theory, jumps out of the data through this coding process, even when
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supplementing it with ‘constant comparison’. To address this, we turn to frac-
tal concept analysis, which can supply the needed logic structure. We note at
the outset that we need make no claim that the world is fractal-like. That is, the
truth correspondence of fractals to reality is not a good standard for judging the
utility of our analytic suggestion. Linear logic can (and does) elucidate all sorts
of knowledge about the world, but few would say that everything in the world
is linear. Similarly, we simply have to show that the inter-scale ontological rela-
tionships suggested by fractals have utility for grounded theory analysis.
Fractal concept analysis
A S O C I A L S C I E N C E I N T RO D U C T I O N TO F R AC TA L S
Fractals are structures that are self-similar at various levels of scale.
Mandelbrot (1982) made the initial discovery of fractal patterns by noting cot-
ton prices, which were thought to be chaotic (i.e. functions of unpredictable
phenomena like climate), actually repeat a similar pattern across multiple lev-
els of scale (measured as time; see Figure 1). That is, regardless of whether one
examined the ebbs and flows of cotton prices across several weeks, several
months, or several years, the ‘lightning bolt’ pattern is repeated.
For mathematics, fractals can be expressed as a basic equation for which the
output of an initial run is used as the input for a subsequent one. This process
is called iteration. When this process is repeated in a continuous feedback loop,
and the data plotted, fractal pictures emerge. The basic equation with no real
data is called a ‘generator’; it essentially denotes the form that each run will
replicate (for Mandelbrot, this is the ‘lightning bolt’ structure). Figure 2 depicts
a fractal with a ‘V’ shaped generator. Note that the ‘V’ shape is replicated first
twice, and then four times, as the plotted equation is put through several iter-
ations. While the process of moving toward more complexity is called itera-
tion, the reverse process is called catiteration. So while we may work forward
in the fractal and get more branching ‘V’ shaped patterns with each iteration,
we may also work backward (catiteration) toward the initial ‘V’.
Despite preference for quantitative methods and the widespread recognition
of the limited explanatory power of linear statistics, social science has been rel-
atively slow to explore, much less utilize, fractal approaches. Abbott (2001) is
a notable exception. In a conceptual analysis, he notes the history of the social
sciences themselves can be understood as fractal iteration of a binary genera-
tor based on the Kantian distinction of pure and practical reason.
Following Abbott, Salzinger (2004) offers a less esoteric example of fractal
patterns of gendered identities in the medical professions.8 The branching pat-
tern of this conceptual fractal (Figure 3) is similar to the branching pattern in
the plotted equation of Figure 2. Using fractals, we can depict the way in which
gender constructions play out in the medical professions with more complex-
ity, and thus more accuracy, than linear conceptualizations can allow. For
example, we can understand that the subspecialty of pediatrics is relatively
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feminine when compared with surgery, but that both of these are members of
the physician profession, which is relatively masculine when compared with
the profession of nursing. Linear approaches cannot attend to these types of
complexities (statistically or conceptually), but most often are limited to singu-
lar categorical understandings.
Quantitative social science approaches attempt to attenuate researcher bias
by sacrificing conceptual depth for specification. As the example in Figure 3
shows, fractals hold the promise for systematizing observation without sacri-
ficing complexity. Science relies on logic to find systematic regularities among
observations. Linear logic applies well to natural phenomena, for example
those of physics, but clearly falls short for human sciences, since people are
not just automatons, but rather possess the capacity for intention and will.
Therefore, when assessed by linear logic, human behavior often appears
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FIGURE 1 Fractal seed (trend line) and generator (3-piece lightning bolt shape) in
Mandelbrot’s (2004) analysis of price charts
From: http://www.elliottwave.com/education/SciAmerican/Mandelbrot_Article2.htm
chaotic. While certainly providing insight, linear methods routinely peak at
explaining only 50 percent of the variance in a sample, and that on a very
good day. While we tend to chalk the large portions of unexplained variance up
to the fact that human behavior is rather unpredictable, we might also con-
clude that linear logic simply is insufficient for understanding something as
complex as human life.9
Fractals have the capacity to incorporate multiple styles of logic organized
into generators. For example, a binary generator organizes the fractals found in
Abbott (2001) and Salzinger (2004; see Figure 3). These binary generators not
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FIGURE 2 Data plot of ‘V’ generator iterated two times
Screen capture from: http://id.mind.net/~zona/mmts/geometrySection/fractals/tree/
treeFractal.html














FIGURE 3 Binary gender generator iterated two times for medical professions (derived from
Salzinger 2004 and the Men in Nursing Survey 2004)
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only specify independent kinds of concepts, but also unique styles of hypothe-
sizing interrelationships among concepts on each side of the binary split. This
begs the question about what other sorts of generators we might find useful in
analysis of human phenomenon since the world is not just a series of binary
oppositions.
Returning to mathematical fractals for a moment, the branching pattern of
the ‘V’ shaped generator in Figure 2 has been described as a fractal tree, but
certainly it does not look like any trees we can see in nature. However, as
Figure 4 shows, a slightly more complex fractal generator yields a picture that
looks much more like a tree. This is more than analogy; it illustrates the influ-
ence of the fractal generator on the observational process. This should lead us
to suspect that a more complex conceptual generator can give a more accurate
depiction of social phenomena. Next we present just such a fractal generator,
one organized according to a more human cognition (relative to linear or
binary logic systems), and therefore yielding more accurate depictions of
human phenomenon.
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FIGURE 4 Fractal tree using more complex generator
Screen capture from: http://www.webcalc.net/calc/0467.php
T H E M I C G E N E R ATO R
Multilevel Integrated Cognition (MIC) (Wilson and Lowndes, 2004) employs
four basic ontological categories. These are (1) static, (2) dynamic, (3) evalua-
tive, and (4) self/identity (Wilson and Lowndes, 2004: Table 1; also see
Wasserman and Wilson, 2008, for application of the MIC categories to ana-
lyzing visual media and teaching). These four levels have the capacity to orga-
nize complexity far beyond binary generators. They not only delineate
ontological categories with uniquely formed concepts, but also the relations
between concepts within each level (i.e., static theoretical relationships,
dynamic theoretical relationships, etc.) and, finally, the relations between lev-
els (organized in a hierarchical, Guttman-like system of levels), all put together
in a holistic picture of the human world. As such, these concepts possess par-
ticular inherent interconnections while at the same time avoiding limitations
of substantive conceptual systems (e.g. Glaser’s theoretical coding families).
We first define each of the four levels and then illustrate the interconnect-
edness of the whole system. In doing so it will become clear how MIC, as a
meta-structure, benefits grounded theory by systematically linking concepts
together into theoretical structures.10 This answers the first core problematic
identified at the outset. Second, we move beyond MIC as an ontological frame-
work discerning relationships between conceptual pieces, toward its use as a
fractal generator which illuminates its contributions to working across multi-
ple levels of scale, formalizing the theory building process (for fractal applica-
tions of MIC in visual art, see Wilson et al., 2009; and in music, see Wilson
et al., 2008). This answers the second core problematic.
MIC identifies four kinds of concepts. The static level refers simply to objects
which can be delineated as things unto themselves, elements, things that are
this but not that. But not all observed phenomena are able to be broken down
to the static level. Dynamic concepts refer to action, an ontologically different
kind of thing than the elemental approach of the static level. Where we
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attempt to wrestle dynamics into the realm of statics, we are left with insuffi-
cient conceptualizations. In Zeno’s Paradox of Dichotomy, for example, the
impossibility of moving from point A to point B is logically validated on the
premise that there are an infinite number of midpoints at which one must
arrive before reaching B. This paradox results from an ontological disposition
confined to an atomistic position that cannot fully define the dynamic quality
of nature. The concept of movement is not a series of leaps from point to point,
but a fully dynamic process, for which static objects, like Zeno’s midpoints,
cannot account. Thus, we must retain the vision of dynamic concepts as onto-
logically different from static concepts.
The evaluative level encompasses judgments, values, and feelings. These are
ontologically distinct from levels one and two, since nothing about elements or
processes inherently implies a value embedded in them or a feeling that they
evoke. That a flower has leaves, petals, a stem, grows, and bends toward light
says nothing about whether it is beautiful or ugly. In philosophy, we can see
this delineation reflected, among other places, in Hume’s (1739 [1978])
notion that we cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. As such, a well-formed obser-
vational framework for human phenomenon should recognize an ontological
distinction between level three and the others. Human life, and also that of
other animals, is keenly punctuated by feelings and values (although we might
say the latter are particularly human). These values and feelings are what
essentially separate animals from plants, which have elements and undergo
processes, but do not experience level three.
Level four extends further into the human aspect of knowledge by recogniz-
ing the notion of unique identity. This includes conceptual designations,
which humans can ascribe to various things they observe, such as the way the
concept ‘rose’ usually denotes a complex of elements (leaves, stem), processes
(growth, photosynthesis), and valuative judgments (beauty). Furthermore,
level four encompasses concepts of self, which are distinctly human identities.
We are compelled to designate level four as a distinct ontological category in
our framework because at a particular point human experience transcends
that of animals.11 The very essence of being animalistic is to be guided by sense
as opposed to thought. To be sure, humans often are guided by feeling concepts
born from sensory experience (level three). But in reflexive thought, human
beings extend their existence beyond an animal existence into a realm purely
human. At the identity/self level are concepts of agency, uniqueness, and
creativity.
At this point, one will notice that Glaser’s (1978) theoretical coding families
correspond to our four ontological levels, especially where he designates an
identity-self family. However, a comparison of the MIC generator and Glaser’s
coding families shows the difference between them. The MIC generator identi-
fies ontological distinctions and thus a logic structure. As such, Glaser’s theo-
retical coding families could be folded into our four-level ontological schema
and while this ontological schema was established independently of Glaser’s
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coding families, we might have arrived at them by catiterating from them. For
example, Glaser’s (1978: 75) ‘Dimension Family’ contains ‘elements, division,
piece of, properties of, slice, sector, portion, segment, part, etc.’ From our onto-
logical standpoint, we would fold these largely into the static level.
Furthermore, the MIC generator does not express independent categories as
does Glaser (1978), but rather logically interrelated notions in a system where
the higher levels always contain the lower levels. Humans can be said to incor-
porate all four levels, animals levels one through three, plants levels one and
two, and minerals level one. Thus, as we will see in the next section, applying
the MIC generator to the study of humans and human observation, yields
logical structure to ontologically distinct observations, thereby building a con-
ceptual model, not just a theoretical taxonomy.
Resolving the problematics of grounded theory
In this section we discuss and exemplify how the MIC fractal generator can
resolve the two core problematics of grounded theory, at least for its applica-
tion to social science data (since MIC is a human logic structure, non-human
data would require alternative generators). To achieve this, we first offer an
excerpt of ethnographic fieldnotes from research on the street homeless. This
will illustrate the way in which the MIC generator can provide systematic link-
age between concepts such that they form a conceptual model at a data specific
level of scale. Second, we take concepts generated from that same research
project and catiterate them back toward more macro concept structures,
showing how the MIC concept structure is replicated across levels of scale.
Fractal catiteration operates fundamentally like other versions of grounded
theory, but with fractals, we can see the replication of the same logic structure
each time we abstract. Fractal concept analysis therefore can be seen as a for-
mal mechanism for identifying and validating macro level conceptualizations
derived from micro level observational data.
P RO B L E M AT I C O N E : C O N C E P T UA L R E L AT I O N S H I P S
The right column of Table 2 is an excerpt from fieldnotes generated during an
ethnographic research project with the street homeless. The basic coding of
this excerpt is shown in the middle column and the left-hand column shows
how they are organized by the four level schema of MIC (it is important to note
that the left hand column is not a separate coding process, but rather the iden-
tification of ontological distinction among the substantive codes themselves).
Substantively speaking, codes are shorthand conceptual references for the
comparatively lengthy narrative of fieldnotes. Coding not only functions to
make concepts logistically manageable, it also brings concepts into acute focus
when they otherwise would remain diffuse in the narrative structure of the
data. Moreover, it is important that the substantive content of the codes in the
middle column are precisely the same codes we would have derived without
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any ontological input from the MIC generator, a fact that will become impor-
tant later.
Rather than alter the conceptual substance, interpolating the MIC genera-
tor onto the codes illustrates first that they are not of like kind (some are static
elements, some are processes or relationships, etc.) and second they are inter-
connected in a logical relation. From this excerpt we can see two conceptual
models: 1) the elements of poverty and addiction (static) engaged in cyclical
interaction (dynamic) produce the emotional fatigue and exhaustion of con-
tinued homelessness (evaluative) and 2) people’s actions of giving money
(dynamic) produce a feeling of embarrassment (evaluative) which results in
a diminished concept of self (self/identity).
Two additional points of clarification are needed. First, our short excerpt here
is simple enough so that most people can intuitively make such connections
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T A B L E 2 . M I C c o d i n g o f f i e l d n o t e s
2-22-04 Catchout corner – Except from
MIC level Substantive codes fieldnotes
Male, African American, Then, another AA man came up
1. Static addiction, poverty, and started talking. He said a
space/neighborhood, number of remarkable things. He
treatment programs talked at length about being trapped
in the cycle of addiction and
homelessness. The cycle consisted it
seems of: 1) a drug/alcohol abuse
problem endemic to the circumstance
of homelessness; 2) the process of
Cycle of problems, seeking help; 3) the (in his opinion,
addiction and inadequate) treatment programs
homelessness are a back which consist of a) the intensive part
2. Dynamic and forth not a straight which lasts only 30 days and b)
path the transitional housing part, which
Poverty complicates the man disliked because he was
recovery surrounded by other addicts and
People’s help also hurts living in a house in the middle of the
Fatigue/exhaustion of ‘dope neighborhoods’; 4) this leads to
3. Evaluative cycle relapse and then you wind up back
Embarrassment, on the street. The man also
self-esteem mentioned that sometimes people
4. Self/Identity Compromised self walked by and handed him a dollar,
saying, ‘That’s embarrassing, that
doesn’t make me feel like a man. I
want to work and be a productive
member of society. I just need help.’
He seemed particularly emotional
and fatigued by his circumstances.
between concepts. The tendency may be to question the significance of the rev-
elation of these rather simple conceptual models. However, our point has been
to illustrate the systematic interconnection that the MIC generator yields,
rather than any revolutionary insights into conceptual models of homeless-
ness. The revelation here is methodological: conceptual model building, like the
initial coding of conceptual pieces, can be guided by a transparent process.
Furthermore, this becomes particularly important as data becomes more mas-
sive, esoteric, or foreign to the established dispositions of the researcher, where
raw intuition is less reliable than it is for our simplistic example here.
Second, the reader will note that concepts were not explicated for each of the
four levels in each model. This is a shortcoming of the fieldnote narrative,
which is characterized by comparatively unstructured observation and further
highlights the benefit of employing MIC. The logic structure provided by inter-
polating the MIC generator suggests things we may have missed. For the second
conceptual model, these are easy to specify. That is, implicit static elements (for
example people and their handouts) can be derived from the concepts expli-
cated at levels two, three, and four. While less obvious, missing concepts also
can be explicated for the first conceptual model where no notion of the self or
identity is explicated. As an observation of human phenomenon, MIC would
suggest that the conceptualizations at the other three levels entail some notion
of identity, which has thus far, remained implicit in our conceptualization. For
now, we might suggest that it is a component of human self determined, to a
significant extent, by social structure. This is evidenced by the fact that
the respondent’s emotional fatigue was a level three outcome of the cyclical
process where individual addiction and addiction treatment is embedded in the
social structure of poverty. Given the brevity of our excerpt, these imputations
can only be tentatively postulated, but the MIC generator itself gives rise to
these sorts of possibilities and comparison with other data would clarify them.
As a system of logic, the MIC generator acts like a de-fragmenting program
on a computer. Without a logic structure, we have no way to systematically
transform a pool of independent concepts into conceptual models. By placing
a concept into the generator and then working with its inherent logic, the data
immediately begins to take structure. For example, if we take the single con-
cept of ‘embarrassment’ from the excerpt and place it at level three of the MIC
generator, as it is clearly a concept of feeling, we are immediately compelled to
ask how this feeling is produced, a question that focuses on the dynamic level.
P RO B L E M AT I C T WO : C O N C E P T UA L A B S T R AC T I O N
Grounded theory attempts not only to build conceptual models specific to par-
ticular pieces of data, but for broader contexts. The above excerpt would not be
terribly significant if it stood alone; a researcher likely would not wish to delin-
eate conceptual structures, which explain only one respondent’s homeless
experience. Building more general conceptual models requires making con-
nections throughout one’s data, delineating concepts and concept structures
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which hold for multiple respondents and which theoretically will hold for those
not sampled (although many assert that verification of emergent models is not
the aim of grounded theory, e.g. Glaser, 2002). So if theory construction is to
have any real significance, if it is to suggest concepts and concept structures,
which extend beyond specific sets of observations of particular respondents, it
must have a systematic way of abstracting broader concepts and conceptual
models from those specific to the data.
Just as using the MIC generator gives a systematic way of delineating the
relationships of conceptual pieces, the self-similar structure of fractal analysis
and the notion of catiteration suggests a way to proceed with generalization.
In fractals, iteration works toward complexity, for example, when the fractal
tree branches. But we also can work backwards toward less complex structures
through the process of catiteration. This is, in fact, how Mandlebrot made his
initial discovery (see Mandlebrot and Hudson, 2004). For all of the various
incarnations of grounded theory, all would agree that initially it is data specific
observations that yield insight into more general concepts (though this need
not imply a simple grouping process as discussed earlier). However, fractals
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T A B L E 3 . Fra c t a l c o n c e p t m o d e l o f h o m e l e s s s e r v i c e p rov i s i o n
Scale!
Level
" A B C
1 Institution i. Roles: Homeless as problem,
service providers as solution
ii. Hierarchical relationships
iii. Power, social control
iv. Patriarchy
2 Provision i. Diagnosis of cases (e.g. addiction
and mental illness)
Homeless ii. Healing the sick
Service iii. Normalizing the individual
Provision iv. Treatment model
3 Ideology i. Institutionalized notions of the
good life
ii. Enforcement through repression
or hegemony
iii. Value of work and ownership
iv. Western capitalist morality
4 Self-concept i. The blank-slate human being
ii. Social programming
iii. Self evaluated by congruence with
social structure
iv. Socially dependent self
Note: 1/i – Static; 2/ii – Dynamic; 3/iii – Evaluative; 4/iv – Self/Identity
yield a crucial addition. Catiteration for fractal concept analysis is a process of
abstraction, but also one of uncovering self-similar structures. When read from
right to left, Table 3 shows just such a process (please note that for logistical
reasons the lower levels are not illustrated as contained within the higher lev-
els, as in Table 1).
While we employ our homeless research here only as an illustration, some
general substantive information is a necessary backdrop. Most work on home-
lessness is strikingly similar in that nearly all reaches the same vague bifur-
cated solution: 1) offer more services to the individual homeless; and 2)
address inadequacies of social structures which predicate homelessness (see
Shlay and Rossi [1992] for a meta-analysis of homeless literature). Since
homeless services routinely are postured as at least one part of this solution,
there is a dearth of work critically examining the model on which those
services are delivered, their implicit goals and assumptions, and the ways in
which service institutions financially and ideologically are vested in those
same inadequate social structures which predicate homelessness (for an
exception see Lyon-Callo [2000] and Hopper [2003]). This is not an easy
stance to take because it compels criticism of some very well-meaning and
good-hearted people, but it is as important as it is difficult.
The model in Table 3 emerged from our ethnographic research on the street
homeless, during which we were compelled to assess their complaints of local
homeless shelters by incorporating those shelters and their clients into our
sampling frame. What emerged can generally be understood as part of the
broader phenomenon of the medicalization of homelessness, a theme we later
found addressed in a small corner of the homeless literature (see Hopper,
2003; Lyon-Callo, 2000; Mathieu, 1993; Snow et al., 1986).
Work addressing medicalization of homelessness typically focuses on its
conceptual conflation with mental illness and addiction. From his ethno-
graphic work in a homeless shelter, Lyon-Callo (2000: 330) writes, ‘…focus on
“disease” within the discourses of “helping” actually obliterates discussion of
alternative explanations and thus hinders developments aimed at resolving
homelessness through altering class, race or gender dynamics.’ His narrative
exposition of this point, and his observations of specific shelter practices which
reflect it, yield wonderful insights.
However, while Lyon-Callo (2000) portends connections between the med-
ical paradigm and broader cultural contexts in which it may be embedded,
there is no explicit tie between his shelter-specific observations and these
broader notions. Emergent themes about homeless services from our work are
a substantive complement to Lyon-Callo (2000), but using fractal concept
analysis we show such between-scale linkages, i.e. how a systematic path can
be opened between specific observations of medicalization within homeless
shelters and the broader cultural contexts of which they are an instance.
In column C emergent themes are organized according to the logic of the
MIC generator. Some of these emerged directly from the data; some were
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uncovered in the memo writing process using the schema of the MIC genera-
tor. During the coding process we began to pick up on the notion that the
homeless were routinely postured as ‘the problem’. In opposition, homeless
services were routinely postured as ‘the solution’ (1C-i), sometimes explicitly
and other times by the various ways they were held in contradistinction to ‘the
problem’. These are not benign role definitions, but rather predicate an entire
course of action. These static conceptualizations engender only one possible
dynamic relationship between the two groups (1C-ii). That is, the solution
always stands above the problem in a relationship. The question becomes why
is this the case, i.e. what value does it serve to posture the service providers
above the homeless in an institutional structure? The answer is that it gives
service providers power (1C-iii). We can then recognize the identity of such an
organization as patriarchal (1C-iv).
All of these conceptual themes are embedded in the overall static paradigm
of homeless services as an institutional structure. That is, these are the things
that define the physical organization of the shelter. Just as, in the example
above, we can understand pediatrics as relatively feminine in the context of the
masculine physician profession (Salzinger, 2004), here we can understand
that there are dynamic relationships, values, and an identity within the over-
all static concept of the institutional structure. Conceptual designations at one
level of scale must be read in relation to the catiterated concepts in which they
are embedded. The question of dynamics in row one, for example, is about the
relationship of the static concepts, rather than about pure action; it is a
dynamic concept embedded in an overall static concept.
In column C at level 2 we can see the MIC generator repeat itself, but now
within the overall dynamic concept of service provision (which can now be
more clearly postured against the service institution at the static level).
Homeless service providers seek to diagnose homeless cases, most often as
being either mentally ill or drug addicted (2C-i). These diagnoses not only res-
onate with popular conceptions of homelessness, but funding for services is
often tied to treatment of these particular afflictions. Again, a particular
course of action follows these static disease concepts where service providers
engage in healing the sick (2C-ii), the success of which is judged by the extent
to which the homeless person can be returned to a normal state, i.e. working
and maintaining a residence and other possessions (2C-iii). At the identity
level, we can name this as the treatment model (2C-iv).
For levels one and two together, we can see a conceptual delineation of the
medical model of homeless service provision. Fractal concept analysis adds
conceptual clarity in a variety of ways. First, we can understand that problems
of the shelter are predicated by its structural organization and particularly by
the general acceptance of problem/solution role designation. Freire (1994)
notes that oppression is fundamentally a matter of the elites’ ability to onto-
logically define the world of the oppressed. Here we can see a clear instance
of this. When postured as ‘the problem’ the homeless are stripped of their
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subjectivity, transformed into objects, and therefore easily oppressed by the
medical model, which specifies particular pathologies and then naturally seeks
to treat them. With such definitions in play, what else would the service
providers do? While clarification of institutional structure and the action of
service provision is important, we can use fractal analysis to extend further
into cultural context. We have identified the medical model of homeless ser-
vice provision in terms of its structure and action. While we can see specific
values naturally built into the structure and dynamics of service provision,
fractal analysis allows us to look for intrinsically valuative structures which
function in relation to the static and dynamic components of service provision
(see column B).
At level two in column B, we can see that the diagnosis and healing dynam-
ics are not purely matters of object and action, but are guided by a particular
valuative notion of ‘normality’ (2C-iii), a notion not coincidentally central to
Parson’s (1951) sick role. At level three (column B) we can ask what sorts of
values guide both the overall concepts of structure and service provision of
homeless shelters. As institutions, homeless services employ institutionalized
notions of normality, of success. That is, the homeless person is guided toward
presupposed goals, what we might call institutionalized notions of the good life
(3C-i). As external to, and standing above the individual, rather than emerg-
ing from their own worldview, institutionalized values are implemented
through hegemonic persuasion and the repression of the punishment para-
digm (3C-ii).12 The specific values institutionalized in homeless services reflect
wider cultural notions such as the value of work and ownership (3C-iii). Here
we can see exactly how western capitalist value structures stand in relation to
structural arrangement and treatment dynamic of homeless shelters to legiti-
mate such a paradigm. At the identity level (3C-iv), we can simply refer to this
value structure as western capitalist morality, a value system which stands
above individual human beings (this generally is the feminist critique of west-
ern culture and classic moral philosophy in particular, see Gilligan, 1982), and
presupposes and implements moral qualities of work and ownership (see
Sahlins [1972] for discussion on such values as distinctly cultural products).
We can understand the catiterated value of the model (column B) as quali-
tatively different than the iterated values in the overall static and dynamic lev-
els (1C-iii and 2C-iii). The iterated values in levels one and two can be stated as
the specific values of the organizational schema and the treatment dynamic.
But these do not provide any explanation of why such an organizational
schema or treatment dynamic are selected out of the variety of other possibil-
ities. The overall value concept at level three (column B) gives us this explana-
tion. The patriarchal structure and the medical treatment model are chosen
because they fall in line with broader cultural values of western capitalism, the
protestant ethic.
While within the other MIC levels, we can locate identities for the iterated
conceptual complexes (1C-iv, 2C-iv, 3C-iv), At level four column B, our analysis
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calls us to ask what conception of the human self is endemic to the overall con-
ceptual model of homeless service provision. Just as the structure and action
of the service model is logically consistent with broader cultural values, all of
these are logically consistent with the dominant western concept of the self,
the tabula rasa (4C-i). The social programming dynamic (4C-ii) naturally
emerges when we define the human being fundamentally as a blank slate, a
vessel to be filled with knowledge. The sick, misguided, or morally corrupt
homeless person, as a product of socialization, can only be fixed with more
socialization. Here again, socialization is not a benign process, but rather
works toward particular valuative goals. Specifically, for the fourth level, it
evaluates on the congruence between self and society (4C-iii). Of course, tak-
ing a critical perspective, and noting social structural contributions to home-
lessness, we might question whether it is in fact a healthy individual who does
not fit in a sick social structure. At 4C-iv we can see that the tabula rasa defini-
tion of self postures the human being as wholly dependent on society. While
sociology has no consensus about the relationship of the individual and soci-
ety, and much work tends to see social structure as largely dominant, few
would be comfortable taking the extremist position highlighted here.
In column B we see a catiteration of the four MIC models iterated in column
C. Indeed we can understand homeless service provision as a conceptual com-
plex which entails a structural organization (static), engages in treatment of
the homeless (dynamic), entails particular values of working and ownership
(value), and which employ a particular ontological concept of the human
being (self/identity), which makes possible a social programming model. The
specific themes of column C follow inherently the logic of the MIC generator,
but those four models together also follow the same logic. We can catiterate to
column A to say that it is a model of homeless service provision, which begs
the question about where homeless services stand in relation to other social
institutions. While it is only speculation here, as an institution fundamentally
about the execution of the treatment model, i.e. action, we suspect that it can
be catiterated to an overall dynamic level, when postured in relation to other
social institutions.
Through our exposition of the fractal model in figure seven, one can see that
fractal concept analysis allows a systematic process of abstraction because
catiteration follows the MIC logic structure across levels of scale. Further,
using fractal concept analysis could potentially yield cross-study comparisons,
where, for example, the conceptual relationships between homeless service
institutions and others are analysed, the question brought forth by our specu-
lated catiteration to column A.
Justifying synthesis
We expect that some grounded theory proponents will be skeptical of our
suggestions since it often is claimed that grounded theory rejects any a priori
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conceptual designations (while Glaser [2002] is adamant about this point, his
1978 coding families suggest that there is room for heuristic formulations like
our MIC generator). If indeed all concepts must emerge from the data and frac-
tal concept analysis employs concepts independent of the data, particularly
where we offer the MIC structure as a generator, we must offer some justification.
It is overly simplistic to assert that all concepts must emerge from the data.
Wacquant (2002: 1481) correctly has called this, ‘the epistemological fairy-
tale of grounded theory.’ Clearly none of us can actually be free of all concepts
at the start of a data analysis (see also Dey, 1999). At the very least we must
hold some concept of ‘data’ in order to begin analysis. Rather than clinging
hopelessly to such a rigid and overly-simplistic rule of ‘no concepts,’ we must
take a more sophisticated view and examine which kinds of concepts are
appropriate and which are not. Answering this question is not simply a matter
of identifying meager nuances, but will determine the future success of
grounded theory in a discipline with other methodological techniques that are
evolving alongside increasingly sophisticated epistemologies, although often
unconsciously. Take for example Hierarchical Linear Modeling which implic-
itly recognizes change (slope) as a variable in and of itself, rather than as only
an outcome measure of relation between two variables. To borrow from our
MIC language, we can understand this to be, at least implicitly, the recognition
of fully dynamic concepts, those with ontological status beyond static vari-
ables, the units which are most common to standard linear models.
The ontological categories proposed by MIC are not the same as the sub-
stantive concepts that grounded theory suspends in advance. The reader will
note from Table 2 that using MIC epistemology does not affect the substantive
content of the concepts used to define the data. Rather, when interpolated
onto the substantive codes it simply marks additional ontological information
by delineating what kind of concept it is and its relationship with other con-
cepts through the logic inherent to the MIC generator. What grounded theory
rightly opposes is approaching the data a priori with substantive concepts (what
we might call content concepts). For example, if we had approached the cod-
ing of our excerpt (Table 2) with the often presupposed concepts of mental ill-
ness or addiction, and moreover with a notion of these as casual rather than
symptomatic, we surely would have violated the premise of grounded theory.
However, MIC does not provide any such content, but rather denotes a logical
concept form, and especially forces theorists to consider all possible conceptual
forms and to make a conscious decision on which ontological quality (static,
dynamic, etc.) is most appropriate. The researcher is still able to approach MIC
forms without a priori conceptual substance.
Moreover, since fractals utilize an internal logic, nothing about fractal con-
cept analysis presupposes any particular universal logic structure. In fact, the
insufficiency of such a presupposition is implied in our critique of routinely
applying linear logic to human life. Rather we can see our choice of the MIC
generator as rooted in the data. As MIC denotes a particularly human logic
377Wasserman et al.: Problematics of grounded theory
378
structure, we can say that the MIC generator, as the most basic component of
our analysis, ‘emerges’ from our most basic observation of the data, that it is
data about human beings. If E.O. Wilson had approached his study of ants a
priori with the MIC generator then he would perhaps have violated the premise
of emergence. We have not. In addition, as fractals are self-organized systems,
we can assert the benefit of the MIC generator for human data without whole-
sale denial of other possible generators. In other words, we can move qualita-
tive research away from relativism, without moving toward naïve positivism,
through the fractal notion of self-organized systems. This allows logical obser-
vation without necessitating any particular logic which may not work well for
given systems.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) originally suggested that grounded theory be
evaluated by how well it works. Fractal concept analysis provides a way for the
researcher to systematically abstract from the data and perceive structural
relationships between concepts. Since building theory is by definition depen-
dent on these abstractions and specifying conceptual relations, and the pur-
pose of the grounded theory technique is to build theory, fractal concept
analysis clearly is of benefit.
N O T E S
1. The name ‘fractal concept analysis’ and some of our particular insights into
using fractals for social science indeed are novel. However, we draw here from the
foundational and revolutionary work of Andrew Abbott (2001). Moreover, we
are neither the first to build directly off Abbott’s work (see Salzinger, 2004) nor to
recognize the general potential for utilizing fractals in social science (see Agar,
2004; Kuhn and Woog, 2005; Ward, 1995).
2. See Charmaz (2000) for a critique of the debates surrounding grounded theory,
and (2006) for the historical context of the emergence of the grounded theory
method. Dey (1999) also provides a worthy look back at the contested history of
this method. Rennie (1996) gives an in-depth treatment of the epistemological
underpinning of the divergent approaches of Glaser and Strauss.
3. Glaser (discovery) and Strauss (verification) eventually moved in somewhat diver-
gent directions with their grounded theory method (see Corbin and Strauss,
1990; Rennie, 1996; Strauss, 1987; and Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
4. Open-ended means suspending preconceived concepts when coding, albeit, Dey
(1999: 251) points out that, ‘there is a difference between an open mind and an
empty head.’ We discuss this in more detail later. Also, we prefer a line by line
start, but initial coding can be word by word, or incident by incident depending
on the type of data.
5. Glaser and Strauss (1967) further suggest that this process of continually syn-
thesizing data and concepts ought to be instructive for one’s own work, as well as
guiding interaction between professionals. They write, ‘If each debunker thought
about the potential value of comparative analysis, instead of satisfying his urge
to “put down” a colleague, he would realize that he has merely posed another
comparative datum for generating another theoretical property or category’
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 22). Clearly we agree as this is the very thrust of the
synthesis of grounded theory and fractal concept analysis which we present here.
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6. Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest axial, as a third type of
coding. They see initial coding as the breaking down and axial coding as the
putting back together (see also Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Similarly Clarke
(2005) sees axial coding as elaborating coding categories so they can be integra-
tively diagrammed. Glaser (1992) argued that there was no need for axial coding,
as the theoretical coding families he included in his earlier work ‘weaved the frac-
tured story back together’ (Glaser, 1978: 72).
7. Again, we are aware that Glaser (2002) particularly objects to pigeon holing
grounded theory as a qualitative method, but aside from its broader potential, its
actual impact clearly has been on qualitative research.
8. We should note that this is not the thrust of Salzinger’s (2004) piece, which is a
fractal analysis of gendered identities in Mexican factories. Her medical profes-
sions example, however, is a more widely recognizable context and we thus borrow
it for our explanation, with some addition of our own to the nursing side of the frac-
tal which we derive from the Men in Nursing Survey (Hodes Research, 2005).
9. This echoes generally the feminist critique of science (see Harding, 1991, 1998).
10. We are aware that we may appear to violate the basic epistemological premise of
grounded theory by bringing an a priori framework to bear on observations
of data. Glaser (2002) is particularly bothered by this type of corruption to
grounded theory. However, we ask for temporary indulgence on this point, which
we will address below.
11. It is philosophically and personally important for the authors to note that this
does not compromise arguments for the ethical treatment of animals, which can
be stated in our framework as giving moral standing to those beings who have
level three experience, while still recognizing something distinctive about human
life vis-a-vis non-human animals.
12. Lyon-Callo (2000) well documents the consequences of not accepting the treat-
ment regimen of the shelter.
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